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Recently, developing countries have witnessed a sharp 
increase in foreign bank participation. The authors 
examine the impact on banking outreach using 
newly gathered data for Mexico, where foreign bank 
participation rose from 2 percent to 83 percent of 
assets during 1997-2005. Country-, bank-, and bank-
municipality level estimations show a decline in the 
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number of deposit and loan accounts. While country- 
and bank-level estimations indicate an increase in the 
share of municipalities with bank branches and in 
the likelihood of bank presence, bank-municipality 
regressions show that only rich and urban municipalities 
benefited. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a 
decline in outreach.  
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   During the 1990s, many developing countries embraced financial globalization and, in 
particular, welcomed foreign banks into their banking sectors. Micco, Panizza, and Yañez (2006) 
report that the average level of foreign bank participation among developing countries (as 
measured by the share of assets held by foreign banks) rose from 18 to 33 percent between 1995 
and 2002.
1 Arguably, nowhere has the increase in foreign bank participation been more dramatic 
than in the case of Mexico. Over this period, the share of assets held by foreign banks rose from 
2 to almost 82 percent. Mostly, the increase in foreign bank participation in Mexico resulted 
from foreign acquisitions of domestic banks, as opposed to de novo foreign bank entry. By 2005, 
foreign bank participation was close to 83 percent of assets and five of the top six banks in the 
system had been acquired by foreigners. 
  This study examines how banking sector outreach or breadth – i.e., the extent to which 
the banking sector caters to a large percentage of the population throughout the country – 
changed during a period of drastic increase in foreign bank presence, driven by foreign 
acquisitions. Since we do not have information on the actual share of the population that has 
access to or  uses banking services, we employ a number of proxy measures of outreach. In 
particular, we track the behavior of the number or share of municipalities where banks are 
present and the number of branches, loans, and deposit accounts.  First, using quarterly country-
level data we assess how the share of municipalities with branches, the number of branches, 
deposit accounts, and loan accounts per capita at the country-level changed as foreign bank 
participation increased due to foreign acquisitions. We also separately examine changes in 
outreach for domestic and foreign banks to determine whether domestic banks off-set foreign 
bank behavior. Second, using bank-level data, we examine how foreign bank outreach changed 
after foreign acquisitions. Again, we focus on the number of municipalities with bank presence, 
                                                 
1 Their sample covers 104 developing countries across all regions. 
  1the number of branches, loans, and deposit accounts. Contrary to the country-level regressions 
where identification is weak (particularly because omitted factors might be driving the link 
between outreach and foreign bank presence), in the bank-level regressions, we identify the 
effects of foreign acquisitions by comparing results for banks that were acquired at different 
points in time and by including as a control group a similarly large bank that remained domestic 
throughout the sample (Banorte).  Finally, we conduct a more disaggregated examination using 
bank-municipality-level data.
2  In this context, we examine the extent to which changes in 
outreach within a municipality varied after bank acquisitions by foreigners depending on the 
initial level of GDP per capita and the degree of urbanization of the municipality (i.e., the share 
of rural population). As in the bank-level regressions, identification hinges on comparing 
acquisitions at different moments in time and benchmarking the effects to a bank that was never 
acquired. 
  An extensive literature has examined many of the consequences of financial 
liberalization, in general, and of foreign bank participation, more specifically, in developing 
countries.
3 In particular, the implications of foreign bank entry for bank efficiency, competition, 
stability, and access to credit have been investigated by cross-country and country-specific 
studies, using an array of different data sources.
4 Studies on the impact of foreign bank 
participation on competition and efficiency suggest that foreign bank entry can bring potential 
gains in this area except in environments that limit competitive forces, such as when bank 
concentration is high, bank activities are restricted, and bank entry and exit is difficult (see 
                                                 
2 What in Mexico are known as “municipios”, which we translate as municipalities, are similar to what in the US are 
referred to as counties. 
3 For studies on the effect of capital account and equity markets liberalization, see among others, Henry (2003), 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) and Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Sigel (2007).   
4 See Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez (2003) and Cull and Martinez Peria (2007) for a review of the 
literature. 
  2Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar (2000), Denizer (2000), Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga 
(2001), Unite and Sullivan (2002), Claessens and Laeven (2003), Claessens and Lee (2003),  
Martinez Peria and Mody (2004), Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007)). The research on foreign bank 
participation and stability concludes that for the most part foreign banks contribute to banking 
stability by continuing to lend when faced by financial crises and by lending more under these 
circumstances than their domestic counterparts (see Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney (2000), 
Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001), Goldberg (2002), Martinez Peria, Powell, and Vladkova-
Hollar (2005), Detragiache and Gupta (2006), De Haas and van Lelyveld (2006)). 
  The literature on the implications of foreign bank participation for access to finance has 
primarily focused on the impact on lending to small and informationally opaque firms. To date, 
the evidence on this issue is mixed. Using bank-level data, Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001) 
and Mian (2006) present results for Argentina and Pakistan, respectively, that suggest that 
foreign banks limit access and serve only the largest and most transparent firms. On the other 
hand, also using bank-level data, Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez (2005) find evidence 
that large foreign banks surpass their domestic counterpart in the share and growth of lending to 
SMEs in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Using firm-level data for India, Gormley (2006) 
finds that on average firms located in districts with newly established foreign banks are less 
likely to get long-term financing, but this effect is stronger among the more opaque firms. On the 
other hand, cross-country research also using firm-level data conducted by Giannetti and Ongena 
(2005) and Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria (2006) indicates that though larger firms benefit 
more from foreign bank presence, even small companies enjoy greater access to credit when 
foreign bank participation increases. Finally, taking a more aggregate perspective, using country-
level data for 86 low and lower income countries, Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2006) find 
  3that foreign bank participation is associated with less credit to the banking sector in cross-
sectional and panel tests. 
  In the specific case of Mexico, a number of papers have documented the impact of 
foreign bank entry into this country. Looking at the period immediately following the 1994 Peso 
crisis, when foreign bank participation was low and dominated by wholesale banks, Goldberg, 
Dages, and Kinney (2000) and Peek and Rosengren (2000) conclude that foreign banks in 
Mexico were not volatile lenders, did not retrench in the aftermath of the crisis and, in fact, 
exhibited higher and more stable loan growth rates than their domestic counterparts. On the other 
hand, analyzing the effects of foreign bank penetration in Mexico during 1997-2004, when 
foreign bank participation rose to over 80 percent and five of the largest six banks were acquired, 
Haber and Musacchio (2005) and Schulz (2006) come to less optimistic conclusions. The first 
study finds that foreign banks granted less credit, screened loans more intensively (as evidenced 
by lower non-performing loan ratios), and charged lower interest rate spreads than domestic 
banks to attract lower risk credits. However, foreign banks were more profitable than their 
domestic counterparts because their market power allowed them to charge higher fees. The 
second study concludes that foreign bank participation had a positive, but limited impact on 
banking sector development. More specifically, Schulz (2006) argues that the main contribution 
of foreign bank entry was to help recapitalize the banking sector and to improve its asset quality, 
but had limited effects on efficiency or lending. 
  Our study contributes to the literature on foreign bank participation – both in general and 
for the specific case of Mexico – by analyzing the link between foreign bank acquisitions and 
outreach. This is an interesting and policy-relevant question that is ex-ante unclear and has been 
  4largely unexplored by the empirical literature.
5 Contrasting predictions can be derived from 
existing studies on foreign bank lending behavior. In particular, studies that predict that foreign 
banks tend to “cherry pick” and lend only to the largest most transparent firms (e.g., Detragiache, 
Gupta, and Tressel (2005), Gormley (2006), and Mian (2006)) imply that foreign bank 
acquisitions would be negatively related to outreach, since greater outreach is associated with a 
larger number of loans and a wider branch network reaching smaller clients. For example, 
Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2005) develop a model where if foreign banks are better at 
monitoring high-end customers (for which lending is based on “hard” information, such 
accounting ratios or collateral values), foreign bank entry benefits them but hurts others and 
welfare worsens.
6 On the other hand, studies that argue that large and foreign banks have 
superior transaction and risk management technologies that enable them to reach all types of 
clients including small ones (Berger and Udell, 2006), suggest a potential positive association 
between foreign acquisitions and outreach. Finally, there is the argument that even if foreign 
banks do not cater themselves to small clients, outreach could increase if domestic banks are 
forced to move down the market, expanding their outreach to serve smaller clients. 
  Our results are generally consistent with a decline in outreach following foreign bank 
acquisitions in Mexico during the period 1997-2005. Country-, bank-, and bank-municipality 
level estimations show a decline in the number of deposit and loan accounts following 
acquisitions. Furthermore, this decline is found to be larger in poorer and more rural 
                                                 
5 Using country-level data for 2003-04, Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2006) offer evidence for a small sample of 
low and lower income (18) countries of a negative correlation between measures of outreach (such as branches, 
ATMs, loans and deposits per capita) and foreign bank participation. For a larger sample of countries  (99), using 
the same outreach indicators, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) find a negative association of loan 
and deposit accounts per capita and the foreign bank share, but no significant association with branch or ATM 
penetration. 
6 The idea that foreign banks have a comparative advantage at making loans based on “hard” as opposed to “soft” 
information is rooted in the notion that large and complex institutions or financial institutions for which the 
headquarters are far away have difficulty in processing and transmitting soft information through their formalized 
communication channels (See Stein (2002) and Mian (2006)). 
  5municipalities. Domestic banks only partially offset the decline in foreign bank lending. Finally, 
while country- and bank-level estimations indicate an increase in the share of municipalities with 
bank branches and in the likelihood of bank presence, bank-municipality- level regressions show 
that only rich and urban municipalities benefited.  
  Though our results withstand a number of robustness tests, several notes of caution are 
warranted.  First, in our country-level regressions, we cannot eliminate the possibility that the 
increase in foreign bank participation and the contemporaneous changes in outreach are driven 
by omitted factors. Identification in those estimations is weak and those regressions are only 
presented as suggestive evidence. Bank- and municipality-level regressions, however, allow for a 
cleaner identification of the effect of foreign entry, relying on the fact that acquisitions took 
place at different points in time and controlling for the operations of a similar bank that remained 
domestic.   Second, our outreach indicators are admittedly crude and are not exact measures of 
the share of households that has access to or uses banking services.  Cross-country comparisons, 
however, have shown a close link between outreach indicators such as branches, deposit, and 
loan accounts per capita and the share of households that uses banking services (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2007), Honohan (2007)). Third, the period we study is one 
immediately following a severe crisis in Mexico and it is possible that taking a longer horizon 
could yield different results. Finally, while our study provides new and robust evidence on how 
outreach changed during a period of rising foreign bank participation, with important 
implications for other countries, such inferences have to be made with caution. While Mexico 
experienced foreign bank entry through the acquisition of domestic private entities by foreign 
banks, there are different patterns of foreign bank entry around the world, ranging from heavy de 
  6novo entry to entry of foreign banks through the privatization of government-owned banks and 
results might vary in those cases.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an account of the 
changes in bank ownership experienced by the Mexican banking sector since the early 1990s. 
Section III describes the data used, while section IV lays out the methodology pursued to 
examine how outreach changed along with the increase in foreign bank participation. Section V 
presents our empirical results. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. The Mexican banking sector: from government to foreign ownership 
  In the span of two decades, the Mexican banking sector experienced an incredible 
transformation going from a government run sector to a privately, yet exclusively, domestically 
owned one, only to end up today as a sector dominated by foreign banks. Below we provide an 
account of the significant changes in ownership the Mexican banking sector underwent in recent 
years.  Table I illustrates the development of the Mexican banking system from 1990 to 2005, 
showing the number of government, private domestically-owned banks, and foreign-owned 
banks operating in Mexico over the period. 
  Following the 1982 debt crisis, Mexican banks were nationalized under the López 
Portillo presidency and remained in government hands until 1991. During this period, banks 
primarily used their deposits to fund the public sector. In 1986, for example, over 60 percent of 
bank credit went to the government (Gruben and McComb (1997)). After a decade of 
government ownership, a process of rapid bank privatization took place between June 1991 and 
July 1992 under the Salinas de Gortari administration.  
  7  According to Schulz (2006), the new owners had little banking experience and severely 
mismanaged the banks.
7 Haber (2005) argues that banks’ behavior between 1991 and 1995 was 
also consistent with a tunneling view proposed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarrita 
(2003) by which shrewd bankers took advantage of the lax regulatory and supervisory 
environment in Mexico to engage in widespread insider lending. Others like Gruben and 
McComb (1997) argue that banks’ aggressive lending practices during the post-privatization 
period were fueled by a struggle for market share. Regardless of the reasons behind events, bank 
credit and non-performing loans grew at alarming rates; total real bank lending doubled within 
three years and non-performing loans rose to 17.1 percent by December 2004 (considering loan 
rediscounts as non-performing loans). The on-going build up of non-performing loans was 
exacerbated by the macro imbalances that eventually led to the devaluation of the peso and the 
economic and financial crisis that ensued at the end of 1994.  
  Up until 1994, the only foreign bank in operation in Mexico was Citibank, which had 
been established in 1929, before legislation restricting foreign bank participation was passed in 
1966. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the first attempt by the 
Mexican government to liberalize the banking sector, albeit at a very slow pace.
8 The treaty, 
which came into effect on January 1, 1994, allowed the establishment of chartered subsidiaries. 
Still, NAFTA restricted foreign bank participation severely, providing that US and Canadian 
banks could not own more than 30 percent of a Mexican bank’s capital (Haber (2005)). 
Furthermore, banks from the US and Canada could not acquire a controlling stake in any bank 
whose market share exceeded 1.5 percent and the total market share under foreign control could 
                                                 
7 Also, Haber (2005) argues that payment rules were very lax and bankers had little of their own capital at risk. 
8 While a number of papers have looked at the implications of NAFTA on the Mexican economy, few have 
examined the effects on the financial sector. Furthermore, in most cases, the existing studies have been speculative 
and forward looking rather than based on solid empirical evidence (see Garber and Weisbrod (1993), Welch and 
Gunther (1994), White (1994), Glaessner and Oks (1998)).  
  8not initially exceed 8 percent and it could only rise to 15 percent by the year 2000. Even after 
this period of transition, NAFTA recognized the right of the Mexican government to freeze the 
purchases of Mexican banks, if foreign banks as a group controlled more than one quarter of the 
market. 
  The 1994 Tequila crisis confronted the Mexican government with the urgent need to 
recapitalize banks, hastening the decision to rapidly open up the banking sector to foreign 
interests. By 1998, the government removed all remaining restrictions on foreign bank 
ownership.  The liberalization of the foreign bank entry regime thus came as a result of the crisis, 
rather than the free trade agreement with the US and Canada. 
  Though there was an initial wave of foreign bank entry in 1995 (see Table I), driven 
mostly by investment or corporate banks, the nature and extent of foreign bank ownership in 
Mexico started to change drastically in 1997-1998. Table II provides a list and timeline for the 
foreign acquisitions that occurred between 1997 and 2005. Large international banks such as 
BBVA (Spain), Banco Santander (Spain), Citibank (US), HSBC (UK), and Scotiabank (Canada) 
acquired most of the largest Mexican banks. As a result of these acquisitions, the share of assets 
held by foreign banks increased from 15 percent in 1997 to 83 percent in 2005. 
Foreign bank entry into Mexico allowed the recapitalization of the banking sector and the 
clean-up of banks’ balance sheets. Between 1997 and 2003, capital ratios increased from 9 to 12 
percent and non-performing loans declined from 10 to 3 percent (Haber (2005)).  In what 
follows, we study how outreach changed in Mexico as foreign bank participation rose over the 
period 1997 to 2005.   
 
 
  9III. Data  
Our primary data consist of quarterly banks’ balance sheets and unaudited information on 
the number of branches, deposit accounts, and loan accounts, from the Comisión Nacional 
Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV), the banking regulatory and supervisory authority in Mexico. 
While balance sheets are available at the bank level, data on branches, deposit, and loan accounts 
were obtained per bank, per municipality, per quarter. In other words, we have information on 
the number of branches, deposits, and loans for each bank in each of 1,192 municipalities for 
each quarter from 1997 through 2005.
9 We also have information on the ownership type of all 
banks and the mergers and acquisitions that took place over the period 1997 through 2005 
(Aguilar and Cabal (2004)).  
From the data discussed above, we create different indicators of outreach. In particular, 
following previous work (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007)), we develop both 
indicators of access to (i.e., the possibility to use) and the actual use of financial services.  In 
terms of access, we focus on the presence of bank branches across municipalities both at the 
aggregate, i.e. Mexico-wide level (share of municipalities served), the bank level (number of 
municipalities served) and the bank-municipality-level (probability of a bank being present or 
operating a branch in a specific municipality).  We also consider the number of branches per 
capita at the country-level and the log of the number of branches at the bank and bank-
municipality levels.  These indicators are proxies for the extent to which the Mexican population 
as a whole and across different municipalities has geographic access to bank services, as well as, 
the geographic outreach effort of individual banks. 
                                                 
9 Mexico has close to 2,500 municipalities, however, detailed information is available for 1,163 municipalities. For 
29 of the 32 Mexican states (“entidades federativas”), a category labeled “others” aggregates information for the 
smallest municipalities in each state. Hence, in total there are 1,192 observations in the municipality-level 
estimations. 
  10While easy to understand and interpret, branch penetration has its shortcoming as an 
access indicator.  First, technology has allowed banks to use alternative delivery channels such as 
ATMs, phones, and the Internet.
10 Second, the presence of a branch in a specific municipality 
has its limit as a physical access indicator, as we do not know the geographic distribution of the 
population.
11   
The presence of a branch in a municipality, and thus the physical possibility to use 
banking services, is only one dimension of bank outreach.  Even if people have physical access, 
they might face other barriers, such as socio-economic restrictions, or they might not see the 
need for financial services. We consider two indicators of the actual use of financial services: the 
number of deposit and the number of loan accounts.  Specifically, we consider deposit (loan) 
accounts per capita at the country level, as well as the number of deposit (loan) accounts for each 
bank over time, and for each institution in each municipality in every quarter.  These indicators 
serve as proxy variables for the extent to which the Mexican population as a whole and across 
municipalities uses deposit and loan services, and for the extent to which different banks reach 
out to their clients of these two services in the aggregate and for each municipality.   
As in the case of branch penetration, the deposit and loan account measures have their 
shortcomings. First, they do not capture the quality of services received by customers.  Second, 
customers might have several deposit or loan accounts, so that these indicators are imperfect 
measures of the actual share of population using deposit and lending services in the banking 
system.  However, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) and Honohan (2007) show 
that these account indicators are good proxies for the share of the population that uses banking 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, there is no data available on the access to or use of these alternative delivery channels at the 
municipality level. 
11 Specifically, the population center of a municipality without a branch might be geographically very close to 
another municipality with a branch.  
  11services as reflected in household surveys (i.e., these outreach measures help predict the share of 
the population that uses banking services across countries for which household surveys on the 
use of banking services exist). 
Since our objective is to examine changes in outreach, we focus exclusively on retail 
banks.  We do not consider banks that only have a presence in Mexico City and are clearly either 
niche or investment banks.  Hence, there are both domestic and foreign banks that are left out of 
the analysis for this reason.  Table A.I lists the 14 banks included in our aggregate (country-
level) analysis  and, in parentheses, the banks that merged with any of these 14 banks during the 
sample period 1997 to 2005. The table also shows the initial (as of December 1997) size and 
outreach of each bank. It is important to note that we exclude Banco de Azteca, a domestic bank 
that entered the system in 2002 with a large branch network and high loan account penetration, 
because this bank operated as the consumer finance arm of a retail household item store (Electra) 
prior to 2002. Our findings are thus not driven by the conversion of Azteca into a bank.  
In our bank-level analysis, we focus only on large retail banks.  Specifically, we limit our 
sample to the five large banks that were acquired by foreigners and to Banorte, the only 
remaining large domestic bank. The reason for restricting the sample in this way is that, for the 
purpose of including a valid control group, Banorte is truly the only institution comparable in 
initial size and outreach to the foreign acquired banks (see Table A.I). 
  To measure foreign bank presence, we use information on the ownership type of specific 
banks as well as data on the overall market share of majority foreign-owned banks.  In our 
aggregate analysis, we use balance sheet information across all Mexican banks to calculate the 
share of deposits (in terms of amounts) held by foreign-owned banks.
12  In our bank-level 
                                                 
12 Our results remain unchanged if we measure foreign bank presence by the share of loans granted by foreign 
banks.  
  12analysis, we construct virtual banks, i.e. we treat banks that merged during the sample period as 
one unit throughout the analysis.
13 Doing so yields a sample of six large retail banks, five of 
which ended the sample period as foreign-owned, and Banorte, which remained domestic during 
the sample period.  We identify foreign-acquired banks with a dummy variable that takes on 
value one for the five banks that ended the sample period as foreign-owned starting with the 
quarter after the acquisition (we label this variable Foreign Acquisition).   
  Finally, our empirical analysis also incorporates a number of other country- and bank-
level variables, depending on the estimations. In the aggregate, country-level analysis, we control 
for Mexico’s GDP per capita in constant prices. In the bank-level regressions, we control for a 
number of time-variant bank characteristics, such as size, loan-asset ratio, return on assets 
(ROA), operating costs, and net interest margins, computed from financial statements.  In some 
bank-municipality-level regressions, we interact the foreign acquisition dummy with GDP per 
capita or the share of rural population at the municipality level in 1994. GDP and population data 





To analyze how outreach changed as a result of foreign bank acquisitions we exploit the 
variation in our data along the three dimensions of time, banks, and municipalities.  Specifically, 
                                                 
13 Take the case of Banamex and Citibank. The latter acquired Banamex in 2001; we treat the two banks as one 
throughout the sample. Prior to 2001, we add the data for both banks to create one consolidated institution. We do 
this to avoid the artificial jump in outreach measures (branches, loans, and deposits) that we would otherwise 
observe at the time of the merger. We consider the merged bank to be foreign starting in 2001, since Citibank 
operations were very small relative to Banamex prior to 2001. 
14 GDP data at the municipality level was constructed from value added information derived from the 1994 
Economic Census conducted by INEGI. The share of rural population is defined as the share of population living in 
towns/villages with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. Population data at the municipality level (both total population and 
the share of rural population) come from the 1995 Conteo de la Poblacion conducted by INEGI.  
  13we conduct (i) country-level time-series regressions, with data aggregated across all banks and 
municipalities, (ii) bank panel regressions, with data aggregated for each bank over all 
municipalities, and (iii) bank-municipality panel regressions, with data for each bank within each 
municipality and each quarter.  We discuss each specification in turn. 
  We investigate changes in outreach for the overall Mexican banking system by running 
the following specification: 
Yt = α Foreign Sharet + β GDP per Capitat + εt          ( 1 )    
where Y is one of our four outreach measures – share of municipalities with bank branches, bank 
branches per capita, number of deposit accounts per capita, and number of loan accounts per 
capita – measured in quarter t. Foreign Share, our measure of foreign bank presence, is the 
percentage of deposits held by foreign-owned banks. GDP per Capita, measured in constant 
pesos, is introduced to control for changes in economic conditions that might affect the demand 
and supply of financial services.  The coefficient α indicates whether there is a positive, 
negative, or insignificant association between foreign bank participation and outreach over time 
at the country level.  Since the deposit and loan account data for some banks show unexplainable 
large jumps, we control for these outliers by including quarterly dummy variables for these 
periods.  Further, in the deposit and loan accounts per capita regressions, we introduce step 
variables that equal one after Bancomer (later merged with BBVA) changed its classification of 
deposit and loan accounts.
15  
  We estimate three versions of equation (1): one where the outreach indicators are 
aggregated for all banks in the system, one where we add up the outreach measures for the 
domestic banks only and, finally, one where we consider only the outreach indicators for the five 
                                                 
15 Bancomer started including passbook savings accounts in their deposit account numbers in the second quarter of 
2002, giving rise to a jump in deposit numbers. Also, there was a significant change in the classification of loan 
accounts in the first quarter of 1998.  
  14banks that became foreign-owned during the sample period. Looking separately at the outreach 
indicators for domestic and foreign banks allows us to determine the reaction of both groups of 
banks to the increasing presence of foreign banks in the system. 
Next, we examine the link between bank-level outreach and foreign bank acquisitions, by 
estimating the following equation:  
Yi,t = α Foreign Acquisitioni,t +  bi + qt + εi,t         ( 2 )    
where Y refers to the log of the (i) number of municipalities where bank i is present (has a 
branch) at time t, (ii) number of branches, (iii) number of deposit accounts, and (iv) number of 
loan accounts for bank i in time t. We include bank and quarterly dummies, bi and qt, 
respectively, to lessen concerns about omitted factors affecting the link between foreign 
acquisitions and outreach. Foreign acquisition is a dummy that equals one starting with the 
period after bank i was acquired by a foreign bank.  We include all outreach indicators in logs, so 
that α can be interpreted as the approximate percentage change in outreach following foreign 
acquisition.
16 We estimate equation (2) only for the banks that became foreign-owned during the 
sample period plus Banorte, the only large bank that remained domestic during the sample 
period.
17 By focusing on the six largest banks, we avoid our results being driven by the smaller 
banks, which had little outreach throughout the whole sample period. Also, for identification 
purposes, it is important to have a valid control group. Banorte is the only domestic bank that fits 
this criterion, since it is the only institution that compares in size and outreach to the banks that 
were eventually acquired (see Table A.I).  The coefficient on Foreign Acquisition indicates how 
outreach changed after the top five banks in Mexico were acquired by foreigners banks 
compared to (i) before acquisition, (ii) banks that had not been acquired yet, and (iii) Banorte, 
                                                 
16 While the log specification allows interpreting the coefficient on the foreign acquisition dummy, α, as percentage 
change for small numbers, the exact percentage change is exp(α)-1. 
17 Since we have only six banks, we do not present results with standard errors clustered by banks. 
  15which was never acquired by foreigners during the sample period. To take account of some 
anomalous large jumps in deposit and loan accounts for some banks in some quarters, we drop 
these observations from the regression, while at the same time including step dummies for 
Bancomer in the deposit account and loan account regressions, as discussed above. In robustness 
tests, we control for other time-variant bank characteristics such as bank assets, loan asset ratios, 
overhead costs, and net interest margin and confirm our findings.   
To assess the association between foreign acquisition and outreach within banks within 
municipalities, we utilize the following specification: 
Yi,k,t = α Foreign Acquisitioni,t +  mk + bi + qt + ε i,k,t        (3)   
where k is the municipality indicator and mk are municipality fixed effects. We allow for 
correlation across the error terms of each municipality by computing clustered standard errors. In 
this specification, α indicates the effect of foreign acquisition on outreach by bank i in quarter t. 
As in the case of the equation (2), we include only the five banks acquired by foreigners and 
Banorte to properly identify the effect of acquisitions and to prevent small banks with little 
outreach from biasing our results.   
  We estimate equation (3) using two different functional forms depending on the measure 
of outreach we consider. First, we run probit regressions to estimate the likelihood that a bank is 
present in a given municipality and given quarter as function of foreign acquisition, controlling 
for municipality, bank, and time effects.
18  The marginal effects estimated from these probit 
regressions capture the “extensive” margin of foreign acquisition. Second, we run an OLS 
regression to estimate the effect of foreign acquisitions on the log of the number of branches, 
deposit, and loan accounts in municipalities where banks are present. Here too, we control for 
                                                 
18 Given the biases that might arise from including numerous dummy variables in a probit regression, we also ran 
the regressions for the likelihood of bank presence using OLS, which yielded very similar findings.  
  16bank, time, and municipality fixed effects.  These regressions capture the “intensive” margin, as 
they do not include municipalities without bank presence.
19  Finally, both in the case of the 
probit and OLS estimations, we present regressions where we allow for a differential effect of 
foreign bank presence across municipalities depending on their initial level of economic 
development and degree of urbanization by including interaction terms of Foreign Acquisition 
with municipality-level GDP per capita and the share of rural population in 1994, respectively. 
These interaction terms allow us to test whether changes in outreach were evenly spread 
throughout the Mexican territory. 
 
V. Results 
We begin by exploring simple correlations between foreign bank participation and 
banking outreach at the aggregate, Mexico-wide, level in the form of graphs. Also, we 
graphically depict how measures of outreach changed among the foreign-acquired banks after 
their acquisition. We, then, present regression results using time-series data for Mexico. Next, we 
turn to bank-level regressions. Finally, we report results using the bank-municipality panel 
estimations.  In all cases, we use quarterly data for the period 1997-2005.  
 
  A. Foreign bank participation and outreach – ocular econometrics 
Figures 1 through 4 illustrate developments in banking outreach and foreign bank 
participation in Mexico for the period 1997-2005. Specifically, we graph each of the outreach 
indicators together with the share of deposits held by foreign-owned banks.  Figure 1 suggests a 
positive co-movement between the share of municipalities with bank presence (i.e., with bank 
                                                 
19 As in the bank-level regressions, we exclude the observations with anomalous jumps in deposit or loan account 
numbers. 
  17branches) and the measure of foreign bank participation.  Figure 2 shows a negative association 
between branches per capita and the importance of foreign banks, while Figure 3 shows first an 
increase then a decrease in deposit accounts per capita with the increase in foreign bank 
penetration. Figure 4 suggests a strong negative co-movement between loan accounts per capita 
and foreign bank participation until 2004.  However, after this period both variables are trending 
upwards.  
While the graphs described above show the aggregate changes in outreach as foreign 
bank presence rose, Figure 5 displays our four outreach indicators for the five banks that became 
foreign-owned eight quarters before and after acquisition. Hence, while figures 1 through 4 
incorporate both the behavior of domestic and foreign banks, Figure 5 looks only at the latter.  
Specifically, we normalize municipalities served, number of branches, number of deposit 
accounts, and number of loan accounts to 100 in the quarter of acquisition (time t=0) and then 
average these indicators for all five banks that were acquired by foreigners for the eight quarters 
before and after their respective acquisition dates.  While there is little movement and perhaps a 
slight increase in the municipalities served, both the number of deposit accounts and the number 
of branches fall after acquisition, to around 90 percent of the level at the time of acquisition.  
Most dramatic, however, is the decline in the number of loan accounts.  The largest decline 
happens in the two years leading up to the acquisition when banks reduce their loan accounts by 
over 40 percent, while after acquisition, the number of loan accounts declines by another 25 
percent. This is consistent with the finding by Haber and Musacchio (2005) that the decrease in 
private sector lending began before the acquisitions.  
  18These univariate graphic illustrations are just that - illustrations. They do not control for 
other factors affecting outreach. Hence, we now turn to regression analysis for more formal 
hypothesis testing.  
 
  B. Foreign bank participation and outreach – the country-level evidence 
Table III presents regressions using country-level data across 36 quarters between 1997 
and 2005. The results in Table III Panel A show a positive association between the participation 
of foreign-owned banks and the share of municipalities served. On the other hand, we find a 
negative correlation between the foreign bank deposit share and branches and deposits per capita. 
While the foreign bank share enters negatively in the loans per capita regression, it is not 
significant.  
In terms of economic significance, we find that our regressions predict that a 67 
percentage point increase in the foreign bank share (the actual change observed between 1997 
and 2005) is associated with a 4.4 percentage point increase in the share of municipalities served, 
relative to an initial share of 54 percent. On the other hand, this same increase in foreign bank 
participation is predicted to lead to a decline in 1.8 branches per 100,000 people and 46.6 deposit 
accounts per 1,000 people. This compares to initial values of 8 for branches per 100,000 and 268 
for deposit accounts per 1,000 people. Hence, across the board the effects of changes in foreign 
bank participation appear to be sizeable and in relative terms (i.e., as a proportion of initial 
levels) the decline in branches and deposits seems to outweigh the increase in the share of 
municipalities served.  
Table III Panel B and C consider the aggregate behavior of outreach measures for all 
domestic and, separately, all banks that became foreign-owned, respectively. We find that while 
  19the share of municipalities served by foreign banks increased along with the rise in foreign bank 
participation, domestic banks were present in fewer municipalities as the foreign bank share 
increased. On the other hand, the number of branches per capita declined for both foreign and 
domestic banks, along with the rise in foreign bank participation. While deposits per capita fell 
for foreign banks, we do not observe a decline for domestic banks in response to the increase in 
foreign bank presence. Finally, loans per capita among foreign banks fell as their presence 
increased, while loans per capita rose among domestic banks.  The opposing effects explain why 
overall there is no significant relationship between foreign bank share and loans per capita. 
In summary, the evidence in Table III suggests that while more municipalities were being 
served as foreign bank penetration rose, branch penetration fell for all banks in the system. 
Deposits and loans per capita dropped for banks that became foreign, but the decline in loans 
was partly offset by the behavior of domestic banks, which seemed to have increased the number 
of loans as foreign banks gained market share in Mexico. In relative terms, the decline in 
branches and deposits outweigh the increase in the share of municipalities served, so, overall, the 
increase in foreign bank participation seems to have gone hand-in-hand with less and not more 
outreach. Finally, we also find that GDP per capita is positively and significantly associated with 
branch penetration of all banks and of the five banks that became foreign-owned, while it is 
positively and significantly associated with deposit and loan accounts per capita of domestic 
banks. 
  The results above are robust to a number of alternative estimations not shown but 
available upon request. First, the results remain the same if we lag the measure of bank 
participation to allow for a delayed response to ownership changes and to lessen concerns about 
endogeneity. Second, our findings do not vary if we control for changes in bank concentration, as 
  20measured by the share of deposits held by the top three banks in Mexico. As foreign banks 
acquired domestic banks, concentration levels increased from the range of 50 to 60 percent. 
Some might argue that observed changes in outreach might be driven by changes in 
concentration as opposed to foreign presence. This does not appear to be the case in Mexico. 
 
  C. Foreign bank acquisitions and outreach – the bank-level evidence 
  While the aggregate (country-level) regressions explore the overall effect of foreign bank 
participation on outreach, bank-level regressions enable us to examine changes in outreach after 
acquisitions. Also, relative to the country-level regressions, the bank-level estimations allow for 
a better identification strategy, since we can examine acquisitions that occurred at different 
points in time and compare them to a bank that was never acquired. Specifically, Table IV 
presents bank-level regressions including the five banks that were acquired by foreigners - 
namely Banamex, Bancomer, Bital, Inverlat, and Serfin - and Banorte, the only remaining large 
domestic bank.
20  Here the variable of interest is the foreign acquisition dummy which takes the 
value of one after the acquisitions. 
  The results in Table IV Panel A suggest that after foreign acquisition banks began to 
operate in a larger number of municipalities and increased their branch penetration, but at the 
same time the number of deposit and loan accounts dropped.
21 These regressions control for 
bank and time specific effects, thus the effect of lower outreach after the acquisition by foreign 
banks is relative to the average level of outreach of each bank over the sample period 1997 to 
2005 and the average level of outreach across the six banks in a specific quarter.  These findings 
                                                 
20 As discussed above, we do not include the smaller domestic banks, as they do not seem to be an appropriate 
control group.  
21 When we focus only on the banks that were acquired by foreigners, the foreign acquisition dummy only enters 
significantly and negatively in the loan accounts regression.  
  21are confirmed when we control for changes in Mexican GDP per capita instead of quarterly 
dummies.
22   
The regressions in Panel B show the robustness of our findings to including several time-
variant bank-level characteristics.  Specifically, we include the log of assets to proxy for size, the 
loan-asset ratio to control for retail orientation, return on assets to capture banks’ profitability, 
and operating costs relative to total assets, and net interest margins as a share of assets to account 
for variations in efficiency.  Foreign acquisition continues to enter significantly, with the same 
sign and with almost identical coefficient sizes as in Panel A. Furthermore, none of the bank-
level characteristics enters with a consistently significant coefficient across different dependent 
variables.
23 
  The economic effects of foreign acquisition are quite large, especially when it comes to 
loans. Foreign acquisition led to a 6 percent increase in the number of municipalities served and 
a 7 percent increase in the number of branches. On the other hand, it resulted in a 12 percent 
decline in deposits accounts and 59 percent fewer loan accounts. For the number of 
municipalities served and deposit and loan accounts, these results are largely consistent with 
what is observed in Figure 5 and the results of Table III Panel C. The results are different for the 
number of branches for which Figure 5 shows a decrease rather than an increase as in Table IV. 
The result on the number of branches is also in contrast to the aggregate finding in Table III of a 
decline with higher foreign bank participation. The difference in these results is driven by the 
fact that while the bank-level regressions include time dummies to control for country-wide 
trends, the estimation  in Table III only controls for Mexico’s GDP per capita.
24  
                                                 
22 These estimations are available upon request. 
23 They only become significant if we drop the bank dummies. Hence, it appears that financial characteristics are 
only significant in explaining cross-bank differences in outreach. 
24 In other words, if we drop the time dummies we get similar findings to those in Table III. 
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  D. Foreign bank acquisitions and outreach – the bank-municipality-level evidence 
  While the results using country-wide time-series data for Mexico show the aggregate 
effect of foreign bank participation on outreach and the bank-level regressions allow us to 
identify changes in outreach following acquisitions, the bank-municipality regressions in Table 
V enable us to assess the effect of foreign acquisitions on outreach as a function of municipality 
characteristics such as income and degree of urbanity.  Further, given that for each of the six 
banks we have for more than 1,163 municipalities over 36 quarters between 1997 and 2005, 
these specifications give us greater power and allow us to verify whether the findings at the 
national and bank-level hold up when we focus on a smaller geographical entity.
25  All 
regressions include municipality, bank, and quarter dummies, so that we measure the effect of 
foreign acquisition relative to the average for each bank, municipality, and time period. Panels A, 
B and C present (i) the baseline regression with the foreign acquisition dummy, (ii) regressions 
                                                 
25 There are over 2,400 municipalities in Mexico; however, the available data aggregate the branches, deposits and 
loans for some of the smaller municipalities into a broader category labeled “others”.  There are 29 states which 
report this “other” category. Combined the municipalities included under the “other” category account for less than 





















  23with the foreign acquisition dummy and its interaction with GDP per capita, and (iii) regressions 
with the foreign acquisition dummy and its interaction with the rural population share, 
respectively.  
Panel A of Table 6 suggests that the likelihood of bank presence in a given municipality 
increases after acquisition by a foreign bank, while the number of deposit and loan accounts 
decreases. Foreign acquisition enters positively and significantly in the probit regression and 
negatively and significantly in deposit and loan account regressions.  It enters negatively, but 
insignificantly in the regressions for the number of branches.  The economic significance is 
similar to the regression in Table IV: foreign acquisitions led to a 3 percent increase in the 
likelihood that the bank is present in the municipality, a 24 percent decrease in deposit accounts, 
and a 60 percent decrease in the number of loan accounts.   
  Panel B Table 6 results suggest that richer municipalities experience an increase in 
branches after foreign bank acquisition and a smaller decrease in the number of loan accounts.  
The interaction of foreign acquisition with municipality-level GDP per capita enters positively 
and significantly in the number of branches and loan account regressions, but insignificantly in 
the probit and deposit account regressions.  Comparing the coefficient sizes on the foreign 
acquisition dummy and the interaction terms suggests that the effect of foreign bank acquisitions 
on the number of branches of a given bank in a given municipality is positive only above 3,100 
Pesos GDP per capita in 1994. However, the effect is statistically significant only for 
municipalities with GDP per capita above 19,000 pesos (those in the top 1 percentile of the 
distribution). In the case of loan accounts, except for municipalities with over 45,000 Pesos in 
per capita income (those in the top 0.01 percentile), all other municipalities experienced a 
reduction in the number of loan accounts after foreign acquisitions.  The increase in the 
  24likelihood of bank presence and the decrease in the number of deposit accounts after foreign 
acquisition, on the other hand, are independent of the GDP per capita level of the municipality.   
  Panel C regressions suggest that the change in the likelihood of bank presence and the 
number of bank branches after foreign acquisitions depend on the degree of urbanity, while rural 
municipalities experienced a unequivocal stronger decrease in the number of deposit and loan 
accounts. The foreign acquisition dummy enters positively (negatively) and significantly in the 
probit and branch (deposit and loan accounts) regressions, while its interaction with the share of 
rural population enters negatively and significantly in all regressions.  The coefficient sizes 
suggest that only municipalities with less than 66 percent rural population share experienced an 
increase in the likelihood of bank presence, after the bank was acquired by foreigners. In fact, the 
effect is positive and statistically significant for municipalities with a share of rural population 
below 50 percent. For municipalities with a share of rural population above this percentage the 
effect is negative, but not significant. Similarly, from the coefficient sizes we can infer that only 
municipalities with a share of rural population below 26 percent (i.e., 28.8  percent of 
municipalities) experienced an increase in branches after foreign acquisitions. However, this 
increase is statistically significant only for municipalities in the bottom 5 percentile of the 
distribution of the rural share (i.e., those with a rural share close to 1.5 percent). Municipalities 
with a rural share above 50 percent experienced an economically and statistically significant 
decline in the number of branches.  The negative impact of foreign acquisitions on the number of 
deposit and loan accounts is exacerbated for rural municipalities.  While municipalities with 22 
percent rural population share (25
th percentile) experienced a decrease of 22 percent (59 percent), 
municipalities with 71 percent rural population share (75
th percentile) experience a decrease of 
34 percent (68 percent) in the number of deposit (loan) accounts.  
  25Summarizing, the bank-municipality regression results confirm the findings from the 
bank-level analysis that the probability of bank presence in a municipality increased after foreign 
acquisitions, while the number of deposit and loan accounts decreased.  However, the positive 
effect of the geographic extension of foreign banks appears to be limited to urban areas, while 
the negative effect of foreign acquisitions on deposit and loan account penetration was stronger 
in rural and poorer areas. Finally, foreign acquisitions had a positive impact on branch 
penetration only in very urban and rich areas. 
 
VI. Conclusions  
  Foreign bank entry is a new and significant phenomenon that many developing countries 
are experiencing nowadays as part of a general trend toward financial liberalization and 
globalization. Though a literature has emerged analyzing the impact of foreign bank participation 
on bank efficiency, stability, and access to small business finance, to our knowledge, no study 
had thoroughly examined the implications for banking sector outreach.   
  Using country-, bank- and bank-municipality- level data, this paper analyzes how 
outreach changed in Mexico, during a period of rapidly rising foreign bank presence resulting 
from foreign acquisitions. Our estimations show a consistent decline in deposit and loan accounts 
following acquisitions. On the other hand, while country- and bank-level estimations indicate an 
increase in the share of municipalities with bank branches and in the likelihood of bank presence, 
bank-municipality- level regressions show that only rich and urban municipalities benefited. 
Overall, we interpret our results as suggestive of a decline in outreach following foreign bank 
acquisitions, since banks intermediated fewer deposits and loans and increasingly concentrated 
their operations in rich and urban areas. 
  26  What drives the observed changes in outreach? At least two competing explanations 
might be consistent with our findings. First, changes in outreach might be driven by a need to 
reduce inefficiencies built before the 1994 crisis. In other words, the reduction in outreach could 
be a rational action by profit maximizing banks seeking to reduce their costs and become more 
efficient.  However, both Haber and Musacchio (2005) and Schulz (2006) do not find significant 
efficiency gains after foreign bank acquisition.  On the other hand, both find increases in the 
profitability of the five acquired banks driven by higher fees after they were taken over by 
foreigners.  This points to a second explanation, i.e., the observed outreach patterns might reflect 
a deliberate strategy by foreign banks to cater to the upper end of the market (that is focus on the 
richer and more urban clients) consistent with the argument that foreign banks “cherry pick” 
their clients. Though it needs to be formally tested, this change in business strategy combined 
with an increase in profitability could have been made possible by the limited competition in the 
Mexican banking market over our sample period. Finally, whether the patterns described here 
will continue beyond our sample period or are specific to the early period of entry following the 
Tequila crisis will need to be examined in future research. 
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Table I: Number and types of banks operating in Mexico, 1990-2005 
 
  
1990 1994 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 
Total  number  of  banks  20 33 46 41 34 32 29 30 27 
Government-owned  banks  18  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private  domestically-owned  banks 1  31 29 21 17 13 11 12 12 
Foreign-owned  banks  1  2  17 20 17 19 18 18 15 
Source: Aguilar and Cabal (2004). 
  32 
Table II: Foreign acquisitions of Mexican banks 
Year Acquirer  Target  Resulting  share of bank assets held 
by foreign banks 
1997 Santander  Mexicano  14.63% 
(1) 
1999 Santander  Serfin  31.34% 
(2) 
2000 BBVA  Bancomer  48.04% 
(3) 
2000 Scotiabank  Inverlat  55.36% 
(4) 
2001 Citibank  Banamex  75.50% 
(5) 
2002 HSBC  Bital  81.86% 
(6) 
 
(1)  Banco Santander and Grupo Invermexico sign an agreement in the fourth quarter of 1996.     
  The official merger happens in 1998, but in practice the banks operate as one since the first quarter of 1997.   
(2)  In the third quarter of 1999, Serfin is taken over and absorbed by Santander Mexicano.     
  The legal merger takes place in 2005, but in practice the management change occurs in 1999. 
(3)  In the third quarter of 2000, BBVA acquires Bancomer.           
(4)  Scotiabank acquires a majority of the shares of Inverlat in the fourth quarter of 2000.       
(5)  Citibank acquires Banamex in the fourth quarter of 2001.           
(6)  HSBC agrees to acquire Bital in the fourth quarter of 2002, the official merger takes place in the second quarter of 
2003.   
 
 
  33Table III: Foreign bank participation and outreach – Country-level time-series evidence 
Regressions for deposit accounts per capita include the following dummies to control for outliers: first and second quarter of 1997; fourth 
quarter of 1998; second and fourth quarter of 2000; first, second, and third quarter of 2001; first and second quarter of 2003; first, third and 
fourth quarter of 2005.  Regressions for loan accounts per capita include the following dummies to control for outliers: second, third, and 
fourth quarter of 1998; first quarter of 2001 and third and fourth quarter of 2003. We also include step dummies in the deposit (loan) accounts 
regressions that take on value one starting in the second quarter of 2002 (first quarter of 1998) to control for changes in the classification of 
deposits(loan) accounts by Bancomer. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Panel A shows results using data aggregated at the country-level across all banks. Panel B (C) aggregates data at the country-














   Panel A: Aggregating across all banks 
Foreign  bank  share  0.065***  -0.028*** -0.696*** -0.003 
(% of total deposits)  [9.00]  [17.20]  [3.35]  [1.59] 
Country GDP per capita  -0.302  0.274***  7.238  0.128 
(in 000s of constant pesos)  [1.02]  [2.92]  [0.71]  [1.59] 
Constant 57.471***  4.546***  175.427  -0.158 
  [13.00]  [3.11] [1.11] [0.13] 
Observations  36 36 36 36 
R-squared  0.79 0.86 0.87 0.77 
   Panel B: Aggregating across domestic banks 
Foreign  bank  share  -0.031*** -0.004*** 0.013  0.001* 
(% of total deposits)  [8.02]  [12.99]  [0.30]  [1.96] 
Country GDP per capita  -0.159  -0.003  6.392**  0.053** 
(in 000s of constant pesos)  [1.09]  [0.23]  [2.67]  [2.32] 
Constant 29.531***  1.545***  -65.026*  -0.676* 
  [13.38]  [8.57] [1.74] [1.95] 
Observations  36 36 36 36 
R-squared  0.76 0.89 0.71 0.48 
   Panel C: Aggregating across banks that became foreign 
Foreign  bank  share  0.067***  -0.024*** -0.726*** -0.004*** 
(% of total deposits)  [10.10]  [16.97]  [4.76]  [3.27] 
Country GDP per capita  0.036  0.277***  1.805  0.053 
(in 000s of constant pesos)  [0.13]  [3.24]  [0.30]  [0.92] 
Constant  47.323*** 3.001**  225.703** 0.818 
  [11.77]  [2.25] [2.43] [0.94] 
Observations  36 36 36 36 
R-squared  0.86 0.85 0.88 0.89 
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Table IV: Foreign bank acquisitions and outreach – Bank-level evidence 
In the regressions for log of deposit accounts we drop the following observations since they are outliers: Banamex in first and second quarter 
of 1997; Bital-HSBC in third and fourth quarter of 2005; Banorte in the first quarter of 2005; Scotiabank in fourth quarter of 1998 and second 
quarter of 2000. In the regressions for log of loan accounts we drop the observations for Santander in the fourth quarter of 1998 and in the 
first quarter of 2001, Bital in the third and fourth quarter of 1998 and BBVA in the third and fourth quarter of 2003. We include step 
dummies in the observations for Bancomer in the deposit (loan) accounts regression that take on value one starting in the second quarter of 
2002 (first quarter of 1998) to control for sudden reclassifications.  Robust t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
  




Log of number 
of branches 
Log of number 
of deposits 
Log of number 
of loans 
   Panel A: Baseline regressions 
Foreign acquisition  0.058***  0.070***  -0.123**  -0.883*** 
 [3.73]  [3.70]  [2.57]  [8.26] 
Constant 5.394***  6.741***  13.697***  9.507*** 
 [98.33]  [178.36]  [136.53]  [31.85] 
Observations 216  216  204  209 
R-squared 0.98  0.98  0.94  0.83 
Bank dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  Panel B: Controlling for bank characteristics 
Foreign acquisition  0.054***  0.069***  -0.111**  -0.855*** 
 [3.47]  [3.56]  [2.25]  [7.93] 
Log of total assets  0.022  0.021  -0.041  -0.149 
 [1.20]  [1.01]  [0.99]  [1.24] 
Loan to asset ratio  -0.002  0.157*  0.226  -0.679 
 [0.03]  [1.75]  [1.55]  [1.32] 
Return on assets  -0.305  -1.204  4.248***  8.341 
 [0.53]  [0.92]  [2.64]  [1.13] 
Overhead costs to assets  4.719**  1.812  -10.342  -28.429 
 [2.23]  [0.61]  [1.60]  [1.62] 
Net interest margin to assets  -0.176  0.318  -0.456  -3.538 
 [0.41]  [0.52]  [0.58]  [0.84] 
Constant 5.695***  7.149***  14.166***  10.431*** 
 [21.92]  [24.61]  [26.17]  [6.59] 
Observations 216  216  204  209 
R-squared 0.98  0.98  0.95  0.83 
Bank dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table V: Foreign bank acquisitions and outreach – Bank-municipality regressions  
Regressions for log of deposit accounts include the following dummies to control for outliers for municipalities where the respective bank is present: 
Banamex in first and second quarter of 1997; Bital-HSBC in third and fourth quarter of 2005; Banorte in the first quarter of 2005; Scotiabank in 
fourth quarter of 1998 and second quarter of 2000.  Regressions for log of loan accounts include the following dummies to control for outliers: 
Santander in the fourth quarter of 1998 and in the first quarter of 2001, BBVA in the third and fourth quarter of 2003, and Bital in the third and fourth 
quarter of 1998 for municipalities where the respective bank is present. We also include step dummies in the deposit (loan) accounts regressions for 
municipalities with presence of Bancomer that take on value one starting in the second quarter of 2002 (first quarter of 1998) to control for sudden 
reclassifications. The estimation of the probability of bank presence is conducted using a probit model. Robust t or z- statistics are reported in 




Log of number 
of branches 
Log of number 
of deposits 
Log of number 
of loans  
   Panel A: Baseline regressions 
Foreign acquisition  0.029***  -0.001  -0.271***  -0.909*** 
 [4.31]  [0.12]  [13.29]  [26.10] 
Constant   -0.093**  7.844***  1.822*** 
   [2.25]  [144.64]  [23.46] 
Observations 117496  62910  59072  49211 
R-squared 0.39  0.88  0.69  0.72 
Bank dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipality dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Panel B: Interacting with GDP per capita 
Foreign acquisition  0.021**  -0.012  -0.296***  -0.987*** 
 [2.36]  [1.25]  [10.79]  [25.36] 
Foreign acquisition*  0.004  0.004*  0.008  0.022*** 
GDP per capita  [1.43]  [1.83]  [1.16]  [4.00] 
 -0.096**  7.849***  2.555***  Constant   [2.33]  [144.42]  [38.82] 
Observations 116554  62630  58808  49051 
R-squared 0.39  0.88  0.69  0.73 
Bank dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipality dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Panel C: Interacting with share of rural population 
Foreign acquisition  0.076***  0.025*  -0.179***  -0.794*** 
 [3.49]  [1.86]  [5.60]  [18.16] 
Foreign acquisition*  -0.001**  -0.001**  -0.003***  -0.005*** 
share rural population  [2.34]  [2.54]  [3.98]  [4.08] 
Constant   -0.096**  7.862***  2.566*** 
   [2.35]  [146.19]  [39.56] 
Observations 116554  62630  58808  49051 
R-squared   0.39  0.88  0.69  0.73 
Bank dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipality dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  
Table A.I: Banks included in the country-level estimations 
Table contains all banks that enter the aggregate regressions of Table III and shows their outreach and assets as of 1997, the first year in our sample period. The 
banks in parentheses are banks that were purchased by or merged with the first bank in the respective row during the period 1997 to 2005. For dates of foreign 
acquisitions see Table II. 
* indicates banks included in bank-level and bank-municipality-level regressions. 
Bank Ownership  Number  of 
municipalities where  
















pesos) as of 
1997 
Banregio Domestic  1  3  3,343  325  1,395 
Bansi Domestic  1  1  9,714  173  524 
Inbursa Domestic  2  3  8,712  322  19,611 
Interacciones Domestic  2  2  9,336  100  7,625 
Invex  Domestic  1  1  56 64 2,380 
Ixe Domestic  1  18  26,279  171  2,381 
Mifel Domestic  1  3  5,533  178  2,072 
Bajio  (Industrial)  Domestic  7  22  27,764  234  2,305 
Banorte (Bancentro,  Bancrecer,  Banpais)
* Domestic  318  1,281  3,131,493  14,419  50,947 
Scotiabank  (Inverlat)
* Foreign    125  300  1,129,251  5,369  65,100 
Citibank (Banamex, Confia)
* Foreign    332  1,536  5,054,764  35,637  266,544 
BBVA  (Bancomer, Promex)
* Foreign    432  2,039  4,976,738  82,109  322,250 
HSBC  (Bital, Republic of NY, Atlantico, Interestatal, Sureste)
* Foreign    320  1,767  6,993,346  10,273  115,847 
Santander (Mexicano, Serfin)
* Foreign  247  836  3,948,551  6,139  209,131 
 

























































































































Percentage of municipalities with bank branches
 



































































































Branches per 100,000 people
Foreign bank participation
 










































































































Deposit accounts per 1,000 people
 





































































































Loan accounts per  1,000 people 
  39Figure 5: Foreign bank acquisitions and outreach 
This figure shows the evolution of the average (i) number of municipalities with bank presence, (ii) number of bank 
branches, (iii) number of deposit accounts and (iv) number of loan accounts for the eight quarters before and after 
foreign acquisition.  We first normalize data for the five foreign banks to t=0 for the acquisition quarter, and 100 for  
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